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Today's society is in an Information Age,1 which is "immeasura-
bly enriched" and "seriously imperiled" by rapidly advancing tech-
nology.2 While individuals enjoy the benefit of having access to e-
mail, global positioning system technology (GPS), social media, the
internet, and a plethora of other applications on their phones, this
same technology "endanger[s] the liberties at the core of our consti-
tutional system."3 Unknowingly, individuals are providing the gov-
ernment with ever-easier ways to access and record every action
they take.4 Law enforcement officials need not expend their own
resources to do this because the privacy scheme developed through
the Fourth Amendment and relevant statutes allows law enforce-
ment to simply ask third parties for the information.5 Uncon-
sciously, each individual is giving law enforcement information on
a grand scale that the government historically lacked the resources
to collect.6 Whether it is the telephone company, the grocery store
offering a rewards card, the internet service provider (ISP), Google,
or even companies of which the individual is unaware,7 these com-
panies are creating "digital dossiers" on anyone with a service ac-
count.8 Without due vigilance, this could be disastrous for the fun-
damental protections and liberties that define American society
through the Fourth Amendment.9
1. The Information Age is an era where technology allows individuals to "communicate,
transfer and share information, access data, and analyze a profound array of facts and ideas."
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2002). However, individuals must "plug in" or enter into relation-
ships with entities that then generate records of the individual's personal information. Id.
2. James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale
of Two Futures, 72 MiSS. L.J. 317, 318 (2002).
3. Id. at 321-22.
4. Solove, supra note 1, at 1089 ("We are becoming a society of records, and these records
are not held by us, but by third parties.").
5. See id. at 1148-50.
6. Zachary Gold & Mark Latonero, Robots Welcome? Ethical and Legal Considerations
for Web Crawling and Scraping, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 275, 290 (2018). The type of
tracking the government has access to now was "either impossible or prohibitively expensive
in the past." Id.
7. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1092 (describing companies that buy and aggregate peo-
ple's data from other entities).
8. Id. at 1084. These records are "becoming digital biographies, a horde of aggregated
bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who we are." Id. at 1095.
9. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 322. This trajectory tolerates totalitarian features that




The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Carpenter
v. United States takes a small step toward reigning in this techno-
logical encroachment.10 While imperfect, the decision began a judi-
cial analysis about he impact of the Information Age on constitu-
tional protections, specifically in the context of historical cell-site
location information (CSLI).11 This article analyzes the Carpenter
decision and posits whether the third-party doctrine should be re-
evaluated or overruled in the technology-influenced era. Section II
describes the history of the Fourth Amendment, and Section III ad-
dresses the facts of Carpenter. Sections IV and V discuss the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions, respectively. Lastly, Section VI ex-
amines the problems attendant o the third-party doctrine and sug-
gests reform to the third-party doctrine.
II. HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 12
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
the government to controul the governed; and in the next place,
oblige it to controul itself.
13
The Fourth Amendment was a direct reaction to the colonists' ab-
horrence for British use of the Writs of Assistance.14 In colonial
times, England gave law enforcement officials general and unre-
stricted powers for the better part of four centuries.15 The American
colonists resented the use of this unlimited power in the Writs of
Assistance that enabled British soldiers to invade homes and busi-
nesses.16 These general warrants were random, unannounced, un-
10. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
11. Id. at 2211.
12. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Solove, supra note 1, at 1125 (quoting , The Federalist No. 51, in T i-:
sD 347, 349 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
14. Writs of Assistance were general warrants used by the British against he colonists
which had no expiration. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 26, 53-54 (1937). These arbi-
trary warrants needed no probable cause and were widely abused because they gave officials
absolute and unlimited discretion subject only to the limits of (1) no arresting powers and (2)
only daytime execution. Id.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 51.
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supervised, and enacted without any suspicion of criminal activ-
ity. 17 Eventually, the colonists brought the issue to court.18 James
Otis, Jr.'s 1761 oration at court against the Writs of Assistance
"breathed into this nation the breath of life" and "was the first scene
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and
there the child of Independence was born."1 9 Though the original
draft of the Bill of Rights made no mention of it, the Founders at
the Constitutional Conventions placed high importance on the in-
clusion of what became the Fourth Amendment.
20
The Fourth Amendment protects the security of "persons, houses,
papers, and effects."21 The Founders designed the Fourth Amend-
ment to take decision-making out of the executing officer's hands22
and into the "more trustworthy and sober judgment" of a judicial
officer.23 The Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between liberty
and social order-two concepts which stand on opposite sides of an
ideological teeter-totter.24 The objective was "to guarantee the max-
imum amount of individual freedom that would be possible in a na-
tion that also aspired to be safe, secure, and enduring."25 Therefore,
the Fourth Amendment allows government investigation so long as
17. Stephen Treglia, Precedent-Shattering 'Carpenter'?, N.Y.L.J. (July 30, 2018, 2:35
PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/07/30/precedent-shattering-carpenter/.
18. LASSON, supra note 14, at 57.
19. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted).
20. Id. at 79-80.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. Organized police forces did not exist at the Founding; modern police forces began
organizing in the nineteenth century and did not achieve modern sophistication until the
mid-twentieth century. Solove, supra note 1, at 1105. It is inherently difficult for law en-
forcement officials to balance order and liberty when under social pressure to control and
prevent crime and violence. Id. at 1106. This leads to the official taking short cuts, excessive
force, or unwarranted exercises of discretion and insensitivity or brutality toward constitu-
tionally protected rights of the citizen. Id.
23. LASSON, supra note 14, at 120.
24. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 324-25. Full social order is possible only in repressive
regimes, while full liberty would result in an unsustainable governmental scheme. Id.
25. Id. at 325.
356 Vol. 58
2 2020 Fear of Change 357
searches26 and seizures27 are reasonable. Such reasonableness re-
quires a warrant,28 supported by probable cause,29 which must par-
ticularize 3 "the places to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized."31 In this way, the Fourth Amendment prevented the
"fishing expeditions" and "dragnet investigations" that the Found-
ers resented.
32
Originally, the Court analyzed the Fourth Amendment under a
common law trespass doctrine requiring a physical intrusion on a
constitutionally-protected area by the government before Fourth
Amendment protections were triggered.33 This property-based or
trespass-based analysis dominated Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence for centuries34 until Katz v. United States recognized that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."35 The Court in
Katz found that the trespass was doctrine no longer controlling36
and thereafter adopted an analysis focusing on reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.37 Specifically, the physical trespass doctrine could
no longer safeguard the privacy interests that so motivated the
Founders, and a new threshold for the Fourth Amendment had to
recognize and encompass the substance of that privacy protection.38
As the Court later explained through the Katz test:
[w]hen an individual seeks to preserve something as private,
and his expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to
26. An unreasonable search occurs whenever the intrusiveness of the investigation out-
weighs the gravity of the crime being investigated. Solove, supra note 1, at 1119 n.201.
27. The test for unreasonable seizures examines whether there was "some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in [the] property." United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend IV; Solove, supra note 1, at 1118 ("Generally, searches and
seizures without a warrant are per se unreasonable.").
29. Probable cause exists where the "facts and circumstances within [the police's]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or
is being committed." Solove, supra note 1, at 1119 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
30. Particularized suspicion is a factual basis to believe a particular person is engaged
in illegal conduct. Id. at 1109.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. Solove, supra note 1, at 1125, 1151.
33. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
34. Andrew MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine After Jones, 126 YALE L.J.F.
326, 327 (2017).
35. 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
36. Christopher Totten & James Purdon, A Content Analysis of Post-Jones Federal Ap-
pellate Cases: Implications of Jones for Fourth Amendment Search Law, 20 NEW. CRIM. L.
REV. 233, 238-39 (2017).
37. The reasonable expectation of privacy test comes from Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Katz. See 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 339.
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recognize as reasonable, we have held that official intrusion
into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and re-
quires a warrant supported by probable cause.39
Judicial interpretation post-Katz demonstrated privacy as a con-
cept of total secrecy.40 Total secrecy is a theory wherein the Fourth
Amendment protects only the information that an individual spe-
cifically acts to keep hidden.41 The total secrecy conception is de-
tailed best in the third-party doctrine developed by the Court in
Miller v. United States42 and Smith v. Maryland.43 The third-party
doctrine, as its name implies, governs the collection of information
about one individual from a third party.44 Simply put, "[b]y disclos-
ing to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights in the information revealed."45 The Katz test, together
with the third-party doctrine, became the sole analysis for almost
five decades.4 In 2012, however, the Court strongly reminded that
"the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test."47 The Court
in United States v. Jones declared that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government trespasses on a constitutionally pro-
tected area conjoined with an attempt to find something or obtain
information.48 In Jones's aftermath, appellate courts have analyzed
searches under either a Katz privacy test or a Jones property test,
or both.4
9
39. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
40. Solove, supra note 1, at 1131.
41. Id. Professor Solove contends this conception is not adaptable to advances in tech-
nology; thus, it limits Fourth Amendment protection. Id.; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 2,
at 341.
42. 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (ruling that the government obtainment of bank records was
not a Fourth Amendment search).
43. 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (ruling that the government's use of a pen register at a
telephone company was not a Fourth Amendment search).
44. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009).
45. Id.
46. MacKie-Mason, supra note 34, at 328 n.14; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 405 (2012).
47. Jones, 565 U.S. at 409.
48. MacKie-Mason, supra note 34, at 329. Thus, a GPS monitoring system applied with-
out a valid search warrant to a suspect's car was an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
49. Totten & Purdon, supra note 36, at 234.
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The Court now stands at a precipice where the third-party doc-
trine and total secrecy face the challenges of technological advance-
ments of the Information Age.50 Most personal information now ex-
ists in records kept by a variety of third parties.51 Furthermore,
advancements in technology allow increasingly intrusive means of
investigating target individuals.52 Justice Sotomayor explained her
concern with the sole reliance on either a trespass or third-party
doctrine regime in the Information Age where surveillance need not
physically trespass into the records of the target individual.53 As
Jones described, GPS monitoring precision continues to improve.
54
While Jones was decided on a trespass theory, various Justices
hinted that a longer duration of government tracking could impli-
cate other Fourth Amendment concerns.55 Similarly, in Riley v.
California, the Court recognized that cell phones are such a "perva-
sive and insistent part of daily life" that they seem to be a "feature
of human anatomy."5 Thus, a warrant is required to search the
information stored in a cell phone, even during a search incident to
arrest57 because "[t]he fact that technology now allows an individ-
ual to carry [private information] in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy" of Fourth Amendment protection.58
The Court has been trending toward a Fourth Amendment
threshold based on the amount of information collected: when the
government collects a certain amount of data, regardless if it is pub-
lic or not, the nature of the inquiry changes and the collection be-
comes a search possibly subject to the Fourth Amendment.59 A sim-
ilar inquiry presented itself in Carpenter v. United States, where
the Court was asked to address Fourth Amendment protection im-
plications of the historical location information stored by cell phone
providers.6 0
50. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1084.
51. Id. at 1087.
52. For example, CSLI can now locate a person within fifty meters. Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
53. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413-18; Gold & Latonero, supra note 6, at 288-90.
54. Jones, 565 U.S. at 428 (Alito, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
56. 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts authored both Riley
and Carpenter, which suggests he is "the architect of these new privacy principles." Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, Cracking Open a Can of Worms: Why Carpenter v. United States May
Not Be the Privacy Decision that Was Needed or Wanted, JD SUPRA (July 11, 2018), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/insight-cracking-open-a-can-of-worms-20667/.
57. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
58. Id.
59. Gold & Latonero, supra note 6, at 291 (analyzing Jones and Riley).
60. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CARPENTER
In 2011, police arrested several suspects in connection with mul-
tiple armed robberies.1 One of the suspects confessed, identified
fifteen accomplices in nine robberies, and gave the FBI several
phone numbers of these accomplices, including that of Timothy Car-
penter. 2 Pursuant o the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 3 the
government obtained court orders 4 for two cell phone providers,
MetroPCS and Sprint, in order to obtain Carpenter's CSLI. 5 CSLI
is the time-stamped and location-recorded data collected and stored
when cell phones connect to cell sites to perform ordinary functions,
often several times per minute.6  The government requested 159
days of CSLI records from the two providers.7 Collectively, the pro-
viders produced 12,898 location points spanning 129 days.b
Subsequently, Carpenter was charged with six counts of robbery
and six firearms counts.6 9 Carpenter filed a pretrial motion to sup-
press the CSLI data alleging that the warrantless seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment.70 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan denied the motion.71 Carpenter was
convicted on all but one firearm count and sentenced to over one
hundred years in prison.72 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction by adhering to the third-
61. Id. at 2212.
62. Id.
63. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
64. According to the SCA, the government needs a search warrant for records that are
less than 180-days old but only requires a court order for records that are older than 180
days. Gold & Latonero, supra note 6, at 288. This distinction is significant where court
orders do not require particularized suspicion and, in some instances, judges merely act as a
rubber stamp due to statutory requirements mandating their approval if certain steps are
followed. Solove, supra note 1, at 1150.
65. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
66. Id. For example, imagine a girl, Jane, waking in the morning to her friend calling.
The friend asks her what time Jane would be picking her up for work. Jane hangs up and
texts this friend that she is going to leave the house after she takes a shower. In the shower,
Jane listens to music using her cell phone. As she brushes her teeth, Jane checks her emails
on her phone. Her mom calls while she is making breakfast. During this conversation, Jane's
phone pings some notifications about deals through store applications. Then, Jane texts her
friend when she leaves her house. On the way, she uses Google Maps for directions. Upon
arrival, Jane texts the friend. While waiting for the friend to come to the car, Jane has a text
exchange with her husband about dinner that night. Jane also receives multiple notifications
while on her way to work. In this simple example, Jane's phone collected dozens of CSLI
data points.





72. Id. at 2213.
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party doctrine.7 3 Because Carpenter shared the location infor-
mation with his wireless carriers, the third-party doctrine dictated
he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that infor-
mation; thus, there were no Fourth Amendment implications.
7 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
7 5
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, concluding that
the government's use of CSLI against Carpenter was a search un-
der the Fourth Amendment.76 The Court determined that the gov-
ernment invaded Carpenter's reasonable expectation of privacy in
the whole of his physical movements when it accessed CSLI from
wireless carriers for long durations of time.77 Historically, it was
only practical for the government to pursue suspects for limited du-
rations; therefore, society did not expect the government's ability to
"monitor and catalogue every single movement ... for a very long
period [of time]."78 Using GPS tracking as a touchstone,79 the Court
compared CSLI to GPS location information, stating that time-
stamped data "provides an intimate window into a person's life"
80
because cell phone users have their phones on them almost con-
stantly, giving the government "near perfect surveillance" of the
targeted user.81 Furthermore, historical CSLI allows the govern-
ment to go back in time and effectively tail any individual, subject
only to the retention policies of wireless carriers.8 2 The Court de-
scribed the case as a "detailed chronicle of a person's physical pres-
ence compiled every day, every moment, over several years."8 3 For
this reason, "an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of
73. Id.
74. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889-90 (6th Cir. 2016). Notably, Judge
Stranch's concurrence explained there were Fourth Amendment concerns but that a good
faith exception applied. Id. at 893-94 (Stranch, J., concurring).
75. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
76. Id. at 2220.
77. Id. at 2219. Notably, the Court refused to set time parameters for this decision, stat-
ing "[i]t is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment search." Id. at 2217 n.3.
78. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)). The majority
opinion placed great weight on Justice Sotomayor's Jones concurrence. Id.
79. See, e.g., id. at 2216 ([T]racking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS moni-
toring.... ."); Id. at 2217-18 (like GPS monitoring, CSLI tracking is easy, cheap, and efficient);
Id. at 2218 (historical cell-site records present "even greater privacy concerns than GPS mon-
itoring").
80. Id. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415).
81. Id. at 2218.
82. Id. Currently, cell phone providers retain records for five years. Id.
83. Id. at 2220.
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privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CSLI."
84
The Court declined to apply the third-party doctrine, created
through Miller 85 and Smith,8 declaring that it would be a "signifi-
cant extension" of the doctrine.87 It found that CSLI was categori-
cally different information than telephone numbers and bank rec-
ords.88 The Court opined, "the fact that the information is held by
a third party does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth
Amendment protection,"89-a determination which stands at odds
with the original conception of the third-party doctrine.90 Distin-
guishing Miller and Smith, wherein the individuals assumed the
risk of disclosure to the government by revealing information to a
third party,91 the Court determined that CSLI is not "shared" as
normally conceptualized; rather, it is logged automatically without
any affirmative action by the user "beyond powering up."
92
Justice Roberts further determined the government's search of
Carpenter's cell phone was unreasonable because it failed the prob-
able cause standard.93 The government acquired a court order for
the CSLI records pursuant o Section 2703(d) of the Stored Commu-
nications Act,94 which requires a standard of proof "well short" of
probable cause.95 Therefore, Section 2703(d) utilized an unconsti-
tutional mechanism for accessing historical CSLI due to its failure
to meet the probable cause standard for a warrant.96 In rejecting
84. Id. at 2217.
85. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
86. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
87. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
88. Id. at 2216-17.
89. Id. at 2217.
90. See id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (the doctrine created a "categorical rule"
whereby individuals surrender privacy expectations when disclosing information to third
parties).
91. Id. at 2216 (majority opinion) (analyzing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976) and Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).
92. Id. at 2220 (noting "there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data"
unless the user turned it off, an action that renders the device unusable for its normal func-
tions).
93. Id. at 2221; see also Solove, supra note 1, at 1119 (explaining probable cause and
what it requires).
94. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (requiring the government to
provide "specific and articulable facts" showing "reasonable grounds" that the records are
'relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation").
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. Court orders, issued under a relevance standard, lie
somewhere between subpoenas limited only by the burden placed on the producing party and
warrants requiring probable cause and particularization. Solove, supra note 1, at 1149-50.
96. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
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Justice Alito's dissenting argument,97 the majority noted that sub-
poenas are subject to more relaxed scrutiny without regard to ex-
pectations of privacy in the records because: (1) the Court has never
held the government could subpoena third-party records where the
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the infor-
mation, (2) if subpoenas had no regard for Fourth Amendment im-
plications, no record would be protected, and (3) there is an open
argument whether warrant requirements apply to "modern-day
equivalents" of people's papers or effects, regardless of whether they
are held by third parties.98 The Court emphasized its duty to step
in to ensure Fourth Amendment protections are not swallowed by
scientific progress and innovation.99
In sum, Carpenter v. United States declared that, regardless of
whether information may be held by a third party, a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in location information via CSLI.
Therefore, the government must obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause to acquire this information.100 According to Justice
Roberts:
[w]e decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless
carrier's database of physical location information. In light of
the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic na-
ture of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered
by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection.101
Though a "narrow" decision, Carpenter provides greater protec-
tion to individuals in their technology and information given to
third-party cell phone providers.
1 02
V. THE DISSENTERS
Four Justices dissented, taking completely different views on the
CSLI issue. Justice Kennedy focused on the third-party doctrine
and argued the Court should have adhered to precedent and legis-
lative judgment.1 03 Justice Thomas criticized the Katz doctrine
completely, arguing it removes most of the Fourth Amendment
97. See generally id. at 2246-61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2221-22 (majority opinion).
99. Id. at 2223.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2220.
103. See generally id. at 2223-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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text.104 Justice Alito focused on the differences between subpoenas
and warrants.105 And, Justice Gorsuch called for an entire re-eval-
uation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.106
A. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy's dissent characterized the new rule established
by the majority as a needless departure from established precedent;
he claimed it unhinged the property-based concepts of the Fourth
Amendment.10 7  The third-party doctrine dictated the "com-
monsense principle" that property law analogues are dispositive in
analysis of privacy expectations, 1 0 8 and a defendant has no attenu-
ated interest in property owned by another.10 9 Cell-site records are
similar to the records involved in Smith and Miller because they are
created, kept, classified, owned, controlled, and sold by the third
party; thus, the new ruling creates an "unprincipled and unworka-
ble" third-party doctrine 0 for which the Court failed to establish
guidelines.1 The majority, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, mis-
read Miller and Smith as a balancing test rather than a dispositive
threshold question; furthermore, even if it was a balancing test, the
majority incorrectly protected location information more than bank
records and phone calls.11
2
Justice Kennedy ultimately cautioned the Court to defer to the
legislature instead of imposing constitutional barriers that restrain
further legislative debate.11 3 Here, the government received the in-
formation through a congressionally-authorized process which, Jus-
tice Kennedy highlighted, protected information more than a nor-
mal subpoena.11 4 By determining that CSLI was subject to the
Fourth Amendment, the Court essentially reined in investigative
tools and rendered the cell phone a "protected medium that danger-
ous persons will use to commit serious crimes."115 Justice Kennedy
104. See generally id. at 2235-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. See generally id. at 2246-61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
106. See generally id. at 2261-72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2228. Justice Kennedy argued that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
provided property-based analogies in expectations of privacy rather than abandoning the
doctrine completely. Id.
109. Id. at 2227.
110. Id. at 2224, 2230.
111. Id. at 2234.
112. Id. at 2231-32.
113. Id. at 2233.
114. Id. at 2224, 2235.
115. Id. at 2230.
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also criticized the majority's failure to address threshold questions
for applying this new inquiry.
116
B. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas's dissent called for the dissolution of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test.11 7 He declared that the test
"has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment" and
leads courts to make policy decisions rather than law.118 He also
contended that it removed many words from the Amendment it-
selfn1 9 by defining a search under the Katz test in ways that defy
common understanding120 and by focusing on privacy in ways con-
trary to the text of the Fourth Amendment.121 He explained the
Founders enacted the Fourth Amendment as a protection from the
Writs of Assistance that allowed broad searches of one's home.122 In
Justice Thomas's view, there is a hierarchy to Fourth Amendment
protections, namely property and privacy protections.123 The ancil-
lary protection accorded privacy should not be the "sine qua non of
the Amendment" according to Justice Thomas.124 Justice Thomas
advocated overruling the Katz test, stating the case should involve
whose property was searched, an analysis which returns to the text
of the Fourth Amendment. 
125
C. Justice Alito's Dissent
Justice Alito's dissent expounded the distinction between subpoe-
nas duces tecum and actual searches.12 Where actual searches al-
low law enforcement officers to enter homes and root through pri-
vate papers and effects, subpoenas require parties to search
116. Id. at 2234. Justice Kennedy questioned what makes records a distinct category of
information, how much information can be requested without a warrant, whether a time
limitation depends on the type of information at issue, the scope of Congress's power to au-
thorize the government's collection of information, and how to apply the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness to compulsory processes. Id.
117. See generally id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2241. Justice Thomas argued that Katz rendered the phrase "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" "entirely 'superfluous" and read out the word "their." Id. (quoting United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012)).
120. Id. at 2238.
121. Id. at 2239.
122. Id. at 2240.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2235.
126. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). Subpoenas duces tecum are tools used to compel




through and produce their own records.127 The Founders, in creat-
ing the Fourth Amendment, revolted against the means of acquir-
ing information, not the acquisition itself.128 Justice Alito critically
stated the Founders knew of subpoenas duces tecum, yet chose not
to include them in the Fourth Amendment text.129 Notwithstand-
ing, Justice Alito admitted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
evolved to include subpoenas duces tecum under a less strict stand-
ard.130 Justice Alito conceded that the government satisfied this
burden in Carpenter.
131
Justice Alito also condemned the departure in Katz from prop-
erty-based rights, stating it led people to claim privacy rights in
others' items.132 He qualified this by stating that the majority mis-
understood Miller and Smith as a new doctrine rather than a rejec-
tion of "an argument that would have disregarded the clear text of
the Fourth Amendment."133  Reminding the Court that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal, Justice Alito admonished the ma-
jority for creating a new line of Fourth Amendment doctrine by al-
lowing individuals to object to the search of another individual or
entity.134 Additionally, Justice Alito questioned why the Court now
afforded an individual greater Fourth Amendment protection than
a party actually subject to the subpoena.135
D. Justice Gorsuch's Dissent
Justice Gorsuch agreed with the majority's judgment but de-
parted from its reasoning.13 He began his dissent with two power-
ful questions: "[w]hat's left of the Fourth Amendment" and "[w]hat
to do [about it]?"137 Justice Gorsuch explained that everything to-
day is on the internet and held by third-party servers, including
documents that were historically kept locked away. 138 According to
127. Id. at 2247.
128. Id. at 2251.
129. Id. at 2252. Justice Alito points out subpoenas were not even discussed during the
writing of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
130. Id. at 2254 (citing Okla. Press Pubig Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)). The stand-
ard foregoes probable cause and instead requires the material production to be particularly
described, authorized by law, and relevant. Id.
131. Id. at 2255 (describing the standard for a court order to be "sufficiently limited in
scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreason-
ably burdensome") (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 2259-60. Justice Alito hailed Miller for rejecting this notion. Id. at 2260.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2257.
135. Id. at 2256.
136. See generally id. at 2261-72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).




Miller and Smith, the police could review all of it because individu-
als have no reasonable expectation of privacy in material held by
third parties.139 This presents a problem to which Justice Gorsuch
found three possible responses: (1) ignore the problem and continue
application of Smith and Miller, (2) set aside the third-party doc-
trine and go back to Katz analysis, or (3) look elsewhere.
140
1. Maintain Smith and Miller
Unlike the majority's use of a balancing test, Justice Gorsuch said
Miller and Smith create a categorical rule where individuals who
disclose information to third parties forfeit their Fourth Amend-
ment reasonable expectation of privacy.141 From Justice Gorsuch's
standpoint, the doctrine is unworkable in today's technological so-
ciety precisely because people will inevitably relinquish personal
information while wanting to maintain privacy.142 Justice Gorsuch
noted the Court has never given persuasive justification for the
third-p arty doctrine.1
43
2. Set Aside Miller and Smith and Retreat to Katz
Returning to a Katz regime would inevitably end in the same an-
alytical problems confronted today, according to Justice Gorsuch.
144
He found that history did not support Katz because existing juris-
prudence did not resemble it.145 Furthermore, Fourth Amendment
protections historically depended neither on expectations of privacy
nor on what a judge believed to be reasonable, but rather protected
the person, house, papers, and effects whenever they were unrea-
sonably searched or seized.146 Justice Gorsuch explained multiple
ways that the Katz test conflated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
into an unpredictable and unbelievable mess guided by no single




142. See id. (providing examples including emails from Google and DNA from 23andMe).
143. Id. at 2263; see also Kerr, supra note 44, at 564. In ruling out justifications, Justice
Gorsuch described (1) the Restatement's definition of assumption of the risk-expressly
agreeing to or manifesting willingness to accept risks-has no context in the Fourth Amend-
ment, (2) that voluntary consent to disclose information is the same as assumption of the
risk, and (3) that clarity is no excuse where it would be just as easy to categorically say Fourth
Amendment protections are not per se diminished in information shared with third parties.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2264 (noting it was Katz that produced Miller and Smith).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 2266-67.
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privacy test is empirical or normative remains unsettled; neverthe-
less, this question should be resolved by the legislative, rather than
the judicial, branch.
148
Justice Gorsuch believed the majority needlessly complicated
Fourth Amendment analysis.149 He described two principles that
the majority melded into the Katz test, namely arbitrary power and
permeating police surveillance.150 The Court, however, refused to
provide guidelines on these principles.151 The Court directed lower
courts to first perform a Katz analysis and then evaluate whether
disclosure to a third party outweighed privacy interests in the cat-
egory of information.152 This pyramid ofbalancing inquiries, in Jus-
tice Gorsuch's opinion, puts lower courts on a path "where Katz in-
evitably leads."
153
3. Looking Elsewhere for Answers
Justice Gorsuch believed the answer to the problem lay else-
where.154 The two prevalent ideas he suggested were resorting to
traditional property-based approaches or relying on positive law. 155
First, Justice Gorsuch advocated returning to a property-based ap-
proach to the Fourth Amendment, albeit with a slightly different
focus. 156 By applying a property-based analysis, Fourth Amend-
ment protections and privacy interests would not automatically dis-
sipate when information is shared with third parties.157 Rather,
third parties obtaining information such as CSLI was similar to a
bailment in which the original owner retains interests in the prop-
erty that is possessed by the third party; this approach is counter-
intuitive to Miller and Smith because it provides greater Fourth
Amendment protection.158 In this way, complete or exclusive con-
trol over property was not required for Fourth Amendment
rights. 159
148. Id. at 2265.
149. Id. at 2267.
150. Id. at 2266.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2267.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2268.
156. Id. at 2268-69.
157. Id. (providing examples where giving one's car keys to a valet or asking a neighbor
to watch one's dog does not eliminate the owner's interest in the car or dog).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2269-70 (for example, individuals have a Fourth Amendment interest in their
houses without holding fee simple title).
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Second, Justice Gorsuch balanced positive law and constitutional
protections.1 0 He explained that positive law guides evolving tech-
nologies while constitutional evaluation establishes a floor which
no legislation may subvert.131 Finally, Justice Gorsuch admonished
the majority for "keep[ing] Smith and Miller on life support" and
Carpenter for not invoking any property right which would have
been "his most promising line of argument."
16 2
VI. THE PROBLEM WITH THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Rather than side-step the third-party doctrine, the doctrine
should be overruled as a per se categorical limitation on Fourth
Amendment protection. The majority alluded to but refrained from
doing so.133 Justice Gorsuch called for reevaluation. 1 4 The doctrine
continues to have value in situations involving informants and tra-
ditional tracking practices.165 Especially in today's ever-growing
technological world, the antiquated third-party doctrine stands for
principles no longer applicable to the enormity of stored and shared
data.13 As technological advancements unfold, its implications on
the Fourth Amendment grow.16 7 Increasingly, a constitutionally
appropriate distinction must be struck as to which technological
"enhancements of human capabilities" should be regulated by the
Fourth Amendment and which should "be able to promote societal
safety unfettered by Fourth Amendment demands." 1 8 Not surpris-
ingly, half of law enforcement agencies have no formal policies or
processes in using technology or the internet in investigations.16 9
Indeed, algorithms and artificial intelligence have allowed com-
puters and computer programs to collect, analyze, and store vast
amounts of information beyond that of human capability.170 Com-
puters now store what used to be kept within the home-docu-
ments, photographs, records, and other private matters.1 71 Moreo-
ver, facial recognition technology infringes upon intimate privacy
interests. Such technology identifies persons, not only through
160. Id. at 2270.
161. Id. at 2270-71.
162. Id. at 2272.
163. See generally id. at 2211-23 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
165. Solove, supra note 1, at 1136.
166. Id. at 1087.
167. See supra Introduction.
168. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 323.
169. Gold & Latonero, supra note 6, at 285. This lack of oversight and thus self-regulating
nature resembles that of the Writs of Assistance abhorred by the Founders. Id.
170. Id. at 277.
171. Id. at 290.
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their own pictures, but also in images posted by strangers.172 Con-
sequently, the current scheme does not account for the increasing
invasiveness of technology.
A. Third-Party Support
Professor Orin Kerr may fairly be described as the chief propo-
nent of the third-party doctrine.173 He defends that use of the third-
party doctrine outweigh its criticism for various reasons, not the
least of which is a dearth of any reasonable alternatives.174 He as-
serted that the doctrine: (1) creates reasonable divides between less
invasive investigatory procedures and more intrusive procedures
requiring probable cause,175 (2) maintains technological neutrality
of the Fourth Amendment by prohibiting a substitution of public for
private transactions, 176 and (3) provides ex ante clarity by eliminat-
ing the need to track information's history.177 Kerr explained that
the third-party doctrine is best understood as a "consent doctrine"
rather than an application of the reasonable expectation of privacy
approach.178 Further, it is a shared-space doctrine where the indi-
vidual consents to a third party having control over the infor-
mation.179 Lastly, he criticizes opposing arguments for treating the
Fourth Amendment as a be-all-end-all, rather than one of many
172. Id. at 284. Besides this recognition, metadata is also collected from these photos,
including the times and locations, as well as the people at the same location or in the same
picture. Id.
173. See generally Orin Kerr, BERKELEY LAW,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/orin-kerr/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2020). Professor Kerr has written over sixty articles, the majority of which have been cited
by judicial opinions. Id.
174. Kerr, supra note 44, at 581.
175. Id. at 574.
176. Historically, crimes had a public and a private element. Id. at 573. The public com-
ponent was critical to police investigation; however, the use of technology and third parties
have substituted "a hidden transaction for the previously open event." Id. at 575. The third-
party doctrine, then, maintains the status quo. Id. at 581.
177. Id. at 565. This analysis posits that the history of an individual's information is
unknowable at the time law enforcement officials seek it; therefore, it is easier to determine
the information's privacy interests based on its location. The third-party doctrine guarantees
that all information at a particular location is treated the same. Id. at 582. Difficulty lies in
creating a doctrine to replace the third-party doctrine's clarity in the face of the possible
exclusion of evidence if improperly judged. Id.
178. Id. at 588-89. Professor Kerr explained that the United States Supreme Court's ap-
plications of the third-party doctrine have been "awkward and unconvincing" because in his
opinion, the Court incorrectly focused on the application of Katzs privacy test rather than
consent principles. Id. at 588. Professor Kerr contends that as long as it is a knowing dis-
closure, a person's choice to give the information to law enforcement is a valid and voluntary
consent that extinguishes Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
179. Id. at 589.
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tools to prevent governmental abuses.180 All of these justifications
are short-sighted and only rationalize the use of third parties in ob-
taining information in real time. The justifications do not hold up
in the analysis of third-party records such as CSLI.
181
B. Why the Third-Party Doctrine Should Be Curtailed or Over-
ruled
In this Information Age, Americans have no choice but to estab-
lish relationships with numerous third parties to fully enjoy what
society has to offer.1 82 With every connection, third parties collect
records that are increasingly useful to law enforcement officials.1 83
Rather than a rigid view of privacy, modern society requires shar-
ing of information with others.1 84 Instead, privacy should be seen
as contextual and built through relationships with other individu-
als and entities.185 For example, it seems intuitive that medical in-
formation may be shared from patient to doctor, and the doctor in
turn may share that relevant information with pharmacists or med-
ical insurance companies.1 8 It would be appalling, however, to
think that doctors would be able to share sensitive medical infor-
mation to newscasters or marketers.1 87 In a similar sense, individ-
uals share location information in applications like Uber or Google
Maps.1 88 They also share personal and intimate information in da-
ting applications like Tinder specifically to be matched with a com-
patible partner.1 89 While it is expected that this information be
shared with that partner, individuals do not expect the stored in-
formation to then be supplied to other entities such as the govern-
ment or employers.190 Privacy is an enduring right in American life
and the Fourth Amendment protections need to embrace the chang-
ing attitudes toward those interests to fully embrace the Amend-
ment's original purpose. Therefore, the third-party doctrine is an
180. Id. at 591 (explaining that other amendments, statutes, privileges, the entrapment
doctrine, the Massiah doctrine, and internal agency regulations all similarly regulate gov-
ernment uses of third parties).
181. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211-23 (2018).
182. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1084.
183. Id.
184. Gold & Latonero, supra note 6, at 288-89.
185. Id. at 289.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, supra note 56.
189. Id.
190. Id. Furthermore, there are some technological developments that, by necessity, are
relayed to the government such as autonomous driving technology systems that utilize pri-
vate government networks for navigation and analysis of public roads. Id.
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antiquated doctrine unsuited for the Information Age.191 It gives
the government too much power.192 This is so, especially when con-
sidering the retainability dynamic between fallible human memory
and infallible technological recording of information.193 The third-
party doctrine, therefore, is "not responsive to life in the modern
Informational Age." 194
Statutory attempts to bridge the gap between privacy interests
and technological advancements left in the wake of the third-party
doctrine are weak and "uneven, overly complex, filled with gaps and
loopholes, and containing numerous weak spots."195 Another prob-
lem with the current privacy scheme is whether the threshold
should relate to actual societal expectations or to the original values
underlying the Fourth Amendment.19 For example, what place
should actual public use hold in the evaluation of governmental ex-
ploitation of technology?197 Therefore, the third-party doctrine
must be re-evaluated, if not completely overruled.
Additionally, multiple state supreme courts have rejected the
third-party doctrine as applied to their jurisprudence.198 The Indi-
ana Supreme Court declared "the third-party doctrine plays no part
in our State's search-and-seizure jurisprudence" before applying its
state constitutional analysis instead.199 The Indiana Supreme
Court also noted that the highest courts in California, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey, Utah, and Washington
have rejected the third-party doctrine.
200
Individuals may become targets of investigations based on third-
party disclosures for information that may not be related to them
at all.20 1 Even where individuals attempt to remain anonymous on
191. Solove, supra note 1, at 1087.
192. Kerr, supra note 44, at 572 (explaining the third-party doctrine "gives the govern-
ment more power than is consistent with a free and open society').
193. Id.
194. Solove, supra note 1, at 1087.
195. Id. at 1088.
196. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 415 ("The protection afforded by a living Constitution
might expand or contract due to changes in the fabric of the society for which it was de-
signed.").
197. Professor Tomkovicz suggests that public use requires more than the possibility that
the public could use the technology; it also considers whether society has accepted and actu-
ally made use of such technology. Id. at 417.
198. Kerr, supra note 44, at 564.
199. Zanders v. State, 73 N.E.3d 178, 186 (Ind. 2017), summarily vacated and remanded
by Zanders v. Indiana, 138 S. Ct. 2702 (2018).
200. Id.
201. All individuals who log onto an unsecured network, such as free Wi-Fi at Starbucks,
receive the same internet protocol (IP) address. Erin Larson, Tracking Criminals with In-
ternet Protocol Addresses: Is Law Enforcement Correctly Identifying Perpetrators?, 18 N.C.
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the internet, the law recognizes only that the user "must still ini-
tially 'disclos[e] his identifying information to complete
strangers."'' 20 2 Therefore, the third-party doctrine excepts the activ-
ity from constitutional protection.2 3 While the Carpenter Court did
not address tower dumps, the magnitude of information about in-
nocent people received through tower dumps cautions against the
continuation of the third-party doctrine in the Information Age.
20 4
Government surveillance in this way is subject only to self-regula-
tion by the specific law enforcement department.
205
C. Considerations for Change
While supporters of the third-party doctrine cite to the clarity
created by the doctrine,20° this is not enough to justify the privacy
interests breached. The idea of the third-party doctrine's clarity is
that "[b]ecause the history of information is erased when it arrives,
the law can impose rules as to what the police can or cannot do
based on the known location of the search instead of the unknown
history of the information obtained."207 This line of reasoning does
not hold up when compared to other constitutional and statutory
tests. For example, just like the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion defense in employment discrimination law, Fourth Amend-
ment privacy in third parties can be an inquiry into whether the
information is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise."208 Consider, for example, a
J.L. & TEcH.316, 327 (2017). Internet activity and IP addresses, as understood currently,
are not protected information under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 323.
202. Id. at 326 (quoting United States v. Farrell, No. CR15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at
*2 (W.D. Wa. Feb. 23, 2016).
203. Id.
204. For example, North Carolina law enforcement officials are obtaining "reverse
searches" to gather all information from Google accounts within a seventeen-acre area in-
cluding homes, businesses, bars, restaurants, and apartments to find suspects in crimes. Ty-
ler Dukes, To Find Suspects, Police Quietly Turn to Google, WRAL NEWS (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:05
AM), https://www.wral.com/Raleigh-police-search-google-location-history/17377435/. The
police obtain time, location, names, dates of birth, email, phone number, and types of devices
for each account chosen. Amanda Lamb, Scene of a Crime? Raleigh Police Searched Google
Accounts as Part of Downtown Fire Probe, WRAL NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://wral.com/scene-of-a-crime-raleigh-police-search-google-accounts-as-part-of-down-
town-fire-probe/17340984/.
205. See Dukes, supra note 204 (tactics are "used in extraordinary circumstances because
the department is aware of the privacy issues [raised]") (internal quotations omitted).
206. Kerr, supra note 44, at 582.
207. Id.
208. James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes "Business Necessity" Justifying
Employment Practice Prima Facie Discriminatory Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 36 A.L.R. Fed. 9 (1978).
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telephone provider's financial statements or even the numbers di-
aled from particular phone numbers. They are reasonably neces-
sary to normal business operations; however, the location logging of
where those numbers were dialed is not related to the purpose or
operations of the business. Thus, government information gather-
ing of this data should be subject to Fourth Amendment warrant
requirements.
In formulating a new Fourth Amendment analysis, a modified
property-based analysis could quickly distinguish Fourth Amend-
ment protections.209 An emerging consensus among reported cases
finds that a warrant is required for constitutionally-protected ar-
eas.210 In short, if a police officer walks into an individual's house
in search of evidence, he must have a warrant. This is the most
basic type of situation requiring a warrant.
Additionally, Fourth Amendment analysis must focus on whose
information is sought by the search and how the information was
obtained by the original third party.211 Specifically, the evaluation
must question whether the information was voluntarily, knowingly,
and affirmatively conveyed.21 2 First, there is a distinct difference
in situations where an individual freely explains criminal plans to
a person who is an informant and where an individual who, just by
owning a cell phone, is tracked every minute of the day without any
affirmative actions on that individual's behalf.21 3 While the third-
party doctrine still benefits analysis in an informant context, it
should be reconsidered in other areas of surveillance and investiga-
tion. Second, there even can be a difference seen in an individual
voluntarily and knowingly dialing phone numbers into the cell
phone to connect a call, and again, the individual being tracked
209. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2267-68 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that under a property-based analysis, Fourth Amendment protections do not
automatically vanish when papers and effects are shared with third parties).
210. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012).
211. See Kerr, supra note 44, at 589. Professor Kerr describes the third-party doctrine as
a "shared space doctrine," whereby an individual who discloses information to a third party
consents to its control over that information. Id. While this is correct, this analysis points
to an opposite outcome than that of the third-party doctrine: both parties have an interest in
the information with the individual having a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.
212. The Court began demarking this categorically by stating CSLI is not "shared" as nor-
mally conceptualized. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
213. Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 297 n.3 (1966) (individual confided in
a confidential informant), with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (cell phone provider automati-
cally tracked individual "by dint of its operation").
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every minute of the day without the individual performing any af-
firmative actions to trigger recording.214 On one hand, the individ-
ual's location, including aggregated data of movement inside his
home, is information personal to the individual who has not know-
ingly or affirmatively conveyed such information nor has the ability
to contest the collection thereof.215 On the other hand, an individual
specifically contracts with a telephone provider to make telephone
calls, and therefore the act of dialing telephone numbers is know-
ingly and affirmatively conveyed to the provider. The difference in
these records is clear and distinguishes the records in which an in-
dividual would have an expectation of privacy from those in which
he does not.
VII. CONCLUSION
Today's Information Age both benefits and imperils society. Rap-
idly advancing technology enriches citizens' lives, but it does so at
the cost of relinquishing private information to third parties. The
tension between privacy interests and society's increasing use of
technology creates problems when the government uses this infor-
mation in criminal investigations. In Carpenter v. United States,
the United States Supreme Court addressed this usage in the con-
text of CSLI and Fourth Amendment protections.
Fourth Amendment interpretation has developed throughout his-
tory to include property protections as well as privacy protections.
It began as a limitation against general warrants used by the Brit-
ish and is now a major right enjoyed by all citizens. The United
States Supreme Court reminded lower courts that both interpreta-
tions, property and privacy, are valid analyses in United States v.
Jones. The Court then analyzed Timothy Carpenter's conviction
using CSLI records.
The majority emphatically declared that the third-party doctrine
does not extend to the historical CSLI stored by cell phone service
providers. They declared CSLI is categorically different infor-
mation and, if applied, it would significantly extend the third-party
doctrine. This is so because CSLI is not shared as originally pos-
ited. Moving forward, the government must utilize warrants to ob-
tain such information. The dissenters, however, criticized the deci-
214. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (Smith's affirmative action of
dialing telephone numbers was recorded by a pen register), with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at
2220 (Carpenter made no affirmative steps other than having his cell phone turned on).
215. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (cautioning that the government "achieves
near perfect surveillance" in this manner).
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sion and admonished it for departing from the established prece-
dents and textual reading of the Fourth Amendment. They focused
on the differences between subpoenas and warrants. Justice Gor-
such even called for a reevaluation of the Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.
Professor Kerr defends the third-party doctrine in saying it cre-
ates divides, maintains Fourth Amendment neutrality, and pro-
vides clarity. However, the doctrine leaves citizens susceptible to
intrusion on the private information that, by necessity, individuals
must share with third parties. Statutory attempts to address the
issue are weak and state supreme courts have declined to adopt the
third-party doctrine. Furthermore, individuals become targets of
investigations unrelated to their conduct.
Moving forward, the third-party doctrine must be reevaluated
and tailored to the technological Information Age. A modified prop-
erty-based analysis conjoined with an analysis of whose infor-
mation is at issue and how that information was obtained could dis-
tinguish where the doctrine would be relevant and where it should
not apply to Fourth Amendment analysis.
Carpenter has paved the way for finally allowing Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to concern itself with the technological advancements
of the Information Age. While some attempt to support the contin-
uation of the third-party doctrine, this antiquated regime cannot
answer to the privacy interests implicated with the utilization of
the internet and other technology in government searches and sei-
zures. The doctrine must be replaced with a more workable privacy
scheme.
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